Using a large data set on web browsing and purchasing behavior we test to what extent consumers are searching in accordance to various classical search models. We find that the benchmark model of sequential search with a known distributions of prices can be rejected based on the recall patterns we observe in the data. Moreover, we show that even if consumers are initially unaware of the price distribution and have to learn the price distribution, observed search behavior for given consumers over time is more consistent with non-sequential search than sequential search with learning. Our findings suggest non-sequential search provides a more accurate description of observed consumer search behavior.
Introduction
Since Stigler's (1961) seminal paper, models of costly search have been at the heart of many economic models trying to explain imperfectly competitive behavior in product and labor markets.
The theoretical literature typically models consumer search in two ways: following Stigler's original model, a strand of literature assumes non-sequential search behavior, where consumers sample a fixed number of stores, and choose to buy the highest utility alternative. 1 A much larger strand of the literature, starting with McCall (1970) and Mortensen (1970) , points out that consumers cannot commit to a non-sequential search strategy in instances where the expected marginal benefit of an extra search exceeds the marginal cost. Thus, this literature argues that a sequential search model provides a better description of actual consumer search. 2 Unfortunately, beyond the a priori reasons put forth by the literature, there have been few empirical studies of whether actual consumers follow sequential or non-sequential strategies. This is, no doubt, due to the difficulty of collecting data on individual search behavior. Therefore, most of what we know about individual level search behavior is from laboratory experiments. The majority of the experimental literature on search has focused on sequential search. 3 Schotter and Braunstein (1981) have reported that on average subjects tend to search in a fashion that is consistent with sequential search strategies, although subjects tend to search too little to be searching optimally. Kogut (1990) and Sonnemans (1998) find evidence that individuals are making decisions based on the total return from searching instead of on the marginal return from another draw as they would do if searching sequentially, resulting in too little search. Moreover, Kogut (1990) finds that in about a third of the time individuals accepted old offers, which violates optimal policy. Zwick et al. (2003) also find large rates of recall among participants of an experiment in which a randomly selected object with a known rank order has to be selected. Harrison and Morgan (1990) directly compare non-sequential and sequential strategies to so-called variable-sample-size strategies. The latter strategy is described in Morgan and Manning (1985) and is a generalization of both non-sequential and sequential search since it allows individuals to choose both sample size and how many times to search. Harrison and Morgan (1990) report that experimental subjects indeed employ the least restrictive strategy if they are allowed to do so.
Aside from experimental studies, Hong and Shum (2006) and Chen, Hong, and Shum (2007) are the only papers that we are aware of that have attempted to discriminate between sequential and non-sequential search models using data from a real-world market. Hong and Shum (2006) collect data on textbook prices, and estimate structural parameters of search cost distributions (i.e. the demand parameters) that rationalize the prices set by competing firms. They find larger search-cost magnitudes for the parametrically estimated sequential search model than for the nonparametrically estimated non-sequential search model. Similar data is used in Chen, Hong, and Shum (2007) to conduct a nonparametric likelihood ratio test for choosing among the nonparametrically, moment-based non-sequential and parametrically estimated sequential search models.
Although certain parameterizations of the sequential search model are found to be inferior, they conclude that it is difficult to distinguish between the non-sequential search model and the lognormal parameterization of the sequential search model in terms of fit. This paper utilizes novel data on the web browsing and purchasing behavior of a large panel of consumers to test classical models of consumer search. Our data, described in some detail in Section 2, allows us to observe the online stores visited while shopping for a particular item, and which store the consumer decided to buy from. As pointed out by Kogut (1990) and as we will argue in more detail in Section 3 below, under the reservation price (utility) rule prescribed by the "benchmark" model of sequential search, a consumer always buys from the last store she visited, unless she has visited all stores in her choice set. In Section 4, using data on consumers shopping for books online, we find that this prediction is rejected by a large number of consumers in our data set.
In Section 3, we discuss the Rosenfield and Shapiro (1981) model, which relaxes the assumption that consumers "know" the distribution of prices while deciding on their search strategy, and allow for learning of the price distribution. Importantly, in this setting, the sequential search model can not be rejected based on recall patterns alone. Instead, we derive bounds on search costs that rationalize observed search behavior, and conduct tests based on the consistency of these search cost bounds across shopping trips. In Section 5, we explore whether misspecification of the search model is quantitatively important in our particular setting. In particular, we estimate consumer search cost distributions (the demand parameters) under various search rules. We find that the estimated search costs under the non-sequential search assumption display much less dispersion within person than the search costs estimated under the sequential search with Bayesian learning model. This means the non-sequential search model leads to more stable parameter estimates, and we thus conclude that non-sequential search may provide a more accurate description of observed behavior.
Data
We construct the dataset using two sources of data. The main data comes from the ComScore WebBehavior Panel and includes detailed online browsing and transaction data from 100,000 Internet users for 2002 and 52,028 users for 2004. The users were chosen at random by ComScore from a universe of 1.5 million global users. ComScore is a leading provider of information on consumers' online behavior and supplies Fortune 500 companies and large news organizations with market research on e-commerce sales trends, website traffic, and online advertising campaigns. Each user's online activity is channeled through ComScore proxy servers that record all Internet traffic, including information on visits to a website or domain (browsing), as well as secure online transactions.
The data include date, time, and duration of visit, as well as price, quantity, and description of each product purchased during the session.
We find that individuals in the ComScore sample are representative of online buyers in the United States. Comparing Internet users that have bought a product online on the sample with the Internet and Computer Use Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Forrester Technographics Survey, we find that the samples are similar in terms of the age, education, income,household composition and other observable characteristics. The main differences of the ComScore sample, is that Internet users are older, with higher income, and more likely to be in college (those with "some college but no degree") than the CPS sample. The racial composition is similar across samples-online users are predominantly white. However, compared with CPS, ComScore oversamples Hispanics and Forrester oversamples whites. The geographic distribution of users is similar to CPS population estimates at the regional and state levels. Using the ComScore sample, we find that book buyers, those who purchased at least one book online, are slightly older, with greater income and more education than those who had any online transaction. See De los 6 In order to identify a user's visit to a website as search behavior related to a particular transaction, we link the browsing history up to 7 days before a transaction.
There is no evidence to guide the definition of a search time span in relation to a transaction. One week is long enough to capture all search behavior related to a transaction; any longer intervals are likely to also capture unrelated website visits. A search history could be less than 7 days if another for book A but buys book B first, the search for book A is linked to book B. In the case where multiple books are acquired in the same transaction, browsing is linked to all books purchased. In the results we use several definitions of the relevant search period, from 7 days to the same day of the transaction. Table 2 gives descriptive statistics of the sample. Mean Std. Dev.
Duration of each website visit (in minutes)
Visits not within Given the large number of online bookstores relative to the low number bookstores actually visited, we need to define which bookstores are relevant in the consumer search process as consumers might not be aware of all the online bookstores in the market. We construct consumers awareness of different bookstores by analyzing the consumer's browsing history within the dataset. For each transaction, a consumer is aware of a given bookstore if she has previously visited the bookstores.
For a given search sequence the number of bookstores, N, is defined as the number of bookstores a consumer is aware at the time of the transaction. Figure 1 displays the distribution of consumer bookstore awareness.
A limitation of the ComScore data is although we observe consumers visits to different retailer, we only observe the price of the transaction. We use two methods to recover missing prices for those visited bookstores. First, we use the most recent transaction prices at those bookstores with missing values. Second, we merged the book price information from a price comparison website to recover the distribution of prices.
This second data set contains more detailed information on prices and availability across stores for selected titles and is constructed using data from mySimon.com, a popular price comparison website. 8 By scouring thousands of web sites the search system of mySimon.com lists Internet stores in categories like computers, books, electronics, apparel, music, and movies. Each product listed In total fourteen different bookstores have posted prices on mySimon.com during the sampling period for at least on of the book titles. 9 Table 3 gives some summary statistics for the data.
We use price data from both ComScore and mySimon.com to estimate the bounds of the price distribution, p, p. The prices from ComScore were the minimum and maximum transaction prices for a given product within the entire span of the dataset. MySimon tracks about 40 books during 
Empirical Implications of Search Models
Consider first the classic sequential search model of McCall (1970) , in where a consumer is sampling stores selling a homogenous good. Assuming the consumer believes that each store's price is an iid draw from distribution F (p) (which may arise as the result of a symmetric mixed strategy pricing equilibrium), the consumer will continue to search as long as she finds a price greater than some reservation price ρ(c), where ρ(c) is given by:
As seen in the equation, the reservation price is such that, if the price in hand is ρ(c), the marginal cost of search c equals the expected benefit from continuing searching. (The integral on the righthand side is the expected reduction in price from another search, accounting for the option value of discarding higher price draws.)
Since for a consumer with search cost c the reservation price ρ(c) is constant across searches, the consumer will never recall a price that she sampled earlier, unless there are a finite number of stores, and the consumer has visited all the stores. Our first test of the sequential search hypothesis will thus focus on recall behavior by consumers.
Test 1 (No Recall)
Under the null hypothesis of the McCall model, we should not observe recall of already sampled alternatives, unless the consumers has exhausted sampling all of the stores whose existence she is aware of.
Note that the above test would apply if consumers were considering attributes other than price,
i.e. we could have rewritten the model in which firms were offering a distribution F (u) of net utilities, and the stopping rule would have been couched in terms of a reservation utility level.
Observe that the absence of recall in the model described above depends crucially on the constant reservation price rule. We now discuss a variant of the sequential search model that may lead 10 Since the Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior of the multinomial distribution the posterior distribution will be Dirichlet as well. This means this combination of distribution and prior is relatively easy to work with and allows us to retrieve simple.
11 See Theorem 1 on p.174 of DeGroot (1970).
An attractive feature of the model is that the gains from searching only depend on how sure consumers are about their prior and on the lowest observed price so far. Moreover, if a consumer returns to a previously visited store to buy the good, that is, the consumer recalls, the range of search costs that rationalizes this behavior is relatively small. To see this, suppose there are N possible prices p:
For simplicity, assume the consumer's prior after having observed some initial price p k is uninformative, i.e., N i = 1. The gains from search G(·) at the lowest observed price so far, denoted p * N , are then
Intuitively, the gain is equal to the price at hand minus the expected price when searching, using that a consumer will stick to the current price in the unfortunate event a higher price than p k is sampled. After having observed a second price the searcher will update her prior. We are interested in recall patterns, so suppose this second price is higher than p * N . Since the gains of search only depend on the probability of finding a price lower than p * N , when the second price is higher than p * N the gains from search will only be affected through the change in N :
Therefore, if we observe a consumer searching once more, but returning to the store visited before the additional search to buy the good, we know her search cost should have been:
To illustrate what this implies for the setting we are studying, suppose we observe a consumer searching online for a particular book. The consumer is first going to Amazon.com, then to Barnesandnoble.com, but finally buys the book at Amazon.com for a price of $7. To be able to calculate the search cost that rationalizes the observed behavior, given the above search protocol, we need to make an assumption about the support of the prior as well as how much weight the searcher puts on her prior, which is captured by N . For the latter we take the number of online stores selling books the consumer is aware of, while we use the observed support of the empirical price distribution for the book to approximate the support of the consumer's prior. Suppose this support is [p, p] = [6, 12] , and suppose the consumer is aware of 5 bookstores, so we set N = 5. Assuming an (uninformative) uniform prior distribution, the gains from searching after having observed p * N = 7
at Amazon.com are
Therefore, using equation (2), we know the search cost c of this consumer should have been c ∈ (0.07, 0.08). Note that we only need the transaction price for this calculation, and not the price at 
where k is the number of searchers, if we stick to the assumption that consumers have a uniform prior with upper bound p and lower bound p, this equation simplifies to
Therefore, a consumer searching twice implies
In the online bookstore example, if the consumer were searching non-sequentially instead of sequentially, search cost should have been c ∈ (0.50, 1.00). Note that we only need the support of the empirical price distribution for this calculation. In the non-sequential search model search cost should be higher than the critical search cost value In most other cases the region of search costs that rationalize observed behavior are going to be much larger.
Testing the "no recall" hypothesis
The benchmark sequential search model of McCall tells us that the only instance that a consumer will recall a store is if she exhausts the search by visiting all firms. If the consumer does not exhaust the search, the optimal stopping rule is to buy from the last firm visited (i.e. price is below reservation price).
To test this hypothesis, we have to check whether (i) a consumer recalled a product that was previously sample, and (ii) if there was a recall, whether this was because the consumer exhausted her search over all retailers she is aware of. To do this, we first identify all the stores that a consumer is aware of by looking at previous visits to bookstores by that consumer. E.g., if we observe that the consumer has only visited Amazon and BN in the past, this is a conservative lower bound on the set of retailers that the consumer is aware of.
For a given transaction the consumer visits one store or the consumer searches more than one store. If the consumer visits more than one store, she either buys from the last store, or she recalls a previously visited store. In the case where the consumer visits one firm, we cannot distinguish between sequential and non-sequential strategies. Table 4 : Test of "no recall" hypothesis see that consumers "exhausted" the search possibilities in 58 percent of those transactions where they recalled a previously sampled product. Perhaps, more to the point, consumers did not exhaust the search in 42% of the recalled instances, which is a violation of the basic sequential search model.
Note that our definition of "not exhausting a search" is a conservative one; it may have been the case that the consumer was aware of more bookstores than we were able to capture with our data set. Table 5 looks in more detail at the recall transactions by linking recalls to the bookstores where the final transaction took place. The table shows that in most cases searchers recalled to Amazon and Barnes and Noble: only in 14% of the transactions in which consumers recalled a previously visited firm on the same day of the transaction they recalled a book club or a bookstore from the other bookstores category. 13 Moreover, Table 5 also shows that Amazon.com visitors are much more likely to recall than visitors of other bookstores: on the transaction day 53% of Amazon buyers have recalled, while this is only between 25 and 30% for the other bookstores. 13 Note that some of the recall transactions in the book clubs and other bookstores categories might be to a different bookstores within the same group. As Table 5 shows, given the small percentages this will not have a major impact on our results. The results of the previous section rule out the basic sequential search model with a constant reservation price strategy. However, as we argued above, once we allow for Bayesian updating, the observation recall no longer invalidates sequential search. Thus we proceed with an alternative testing strategy in this section: we will estimate search cost bounds implied by both non-sequential and the sequential with Bayesian updating models. Since this will yield multiple search cost bounds for a given consumer in our data set, we will then check whether one model yields more consistent search cost bounds across transactions for a given customer.
Bounds generated by the Rosenfield-Shapiro model
Recall from Section 3, that under the Rosenfield-Shapiro model, if we observe a consumer searching twice, but buying from the first firm we know his search cost c should be bounded between:
where
To estimate the model we need N,the bounds of the price distribution p, p and the transaction price. N is the number of firms known to each consumer at the time of the transaction. As before, our empirical definition of when a consumer "knows" a store is if she has visited it prior to the transaction within the span of the dataset.
To estimate the bounds of the price distribution, p, p, we use price data from comScore and mySimon.com. The prices from comScore were the minimum and maximum transaction prices for a given product within the entire span of the dataset. mySimon tracks 42 books during For people that searched and bought from one firm, we only observe the lower bound:
Unfortunately, we can not calculate an upper bound for consumers who visited only one store.
For searchers who visited more than one firm (recalled or bought from the last firm), the lower bound of the search cost is
The upper bound of the search cost for those who searched more than one firm and recalled is
For people who searched more than one firm and bought from the last one, the upper bound on the implied search cost is:
Bounds generated by the non-sequential search model with uniform distribution
For a non-sequential model with an uniform distribution, the cutoffs of the search cost are given
where k is the number of firms searched. For a transaction the bounds are
We do not observe the upper bound for those who only visit one firm, k = 1.
Results
For each search session that ended in a purchase, we estimate the lower and, whenever possible, upper bounds for both search strategies. Given an upper and lower bound on the search cost implied by the data, we calculate the midpoint of the bounds as our point estimate of the search cost. 14 We then calculate the within consumer standard deviation of the "midpoint" search cost estimates. Figure 4 displays the within-consumer standard deviation of search costs implied by the sequential vs. non-sequential models (although the "midpoint" is a somewhat arbitrary summary of the bounds, the figure does not change qualitatively if we plot the standard deviations of the bounds separately). Observe that our estimates of search costs based on the non-sequential model display much smaller within-person dispersion than our estimates based on the sequential model. If we believe 14 Since neither model allows us to calculate an upper bound on the search cost when the consumer samples and purchases from a single store, we omit these observations from our calculations. search costs to be relatively time invariant, the figure suggests that the non-sequential model does a better job explaining our data with a parsimonious model of behavior.
Although the nonsequential search model appears to provide estimates that are more consistent across multiple transactions, the following figure, Figure 5 , suggests that our inference regarding the density of search costs might not have been very sensitive to the choice of modelling paradigm. In this figure, we display the (kernel-smoothed) density of the search cost estimates (averaged across multiple estimates per customer) we obtained from the two models. Note that although the implied search costs are somewhat lower under the nonsequential model, as there is more mass near zero under this model, the search cost densities do not appear very different. Table 6 Table 6 : Quantiles of search costs implied by sequential and nonsequential models
Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated to what extent consumers are indeed using the sequential and non-sequential search strategies put forth by the large theoretical literature on search behavior.
By using detailed data on the browsing and purchasing behavior of a large panel of consumers, we have tested various restrictions classical search models put on search behavior. We have shown that the benchmark model of sequential search, where it is assumed consumers know the distribution of prices to sample from, can be rejected based on the recall patterns observed in the data, even if there is a finite number of firms. However, if consumers do not know the distributions from which prices are drawn but instead learn the price distributions using Bayesian updating, recall patterns no longer reject the sequential protocol. Instead, we have looked in more detail at patterns in the search costs that rationalize observed search behavior for given consumers over time, and shown using several tests that a non-sequential search model does a better job in explaining those patterns than a sequential search model with Bayesian updating.
Our finding that the non-sequential search protocol outperforms the sequential search model in terms of explaining observed search behavior for the subjects in our sample is to some extent surprising given that non-sequential search protocol is often thought of as a constrained version of sequential search. However, as shown by Morgan and Manning (1985) the optimal search model allows consumers to choose both the size of the sample and how many samples to take and as such encompasses both the sequential and non-sequential search protocol. When there is a large time lag between making the search decision and obtaining the actual quotation non-sequential search is typically optimal, because it allows the searcher to gather information quicker than would have been possible with sequential search.
Although a typical online shopper will not face large time lags when searching, a non-sequential search strategy might still be a good approximation of the optimal strategy if there exist economies of scale to sampling or if the searcher discounts the future. As argued by Manning and Morgan (1982) , sufficiently large economies of scale to sampling will make it optimal to sample more firms at once and stop afterwards, even if the consumer can continue sampling. Indeed, after one has gone through the hassle of finding the right book and obtaining a price quote at one online bookstore, simple copying and pasting the ISBN number to the website of another bookstore is enough to obtain an additional price quotation. Some preliminary evidence on whether this is indeed what is going on is presented in Figure 6 (a), where we have plotted kernel density plots of the durations of the first and second search for searches on the same day and previous day of the transaction, conditional on searching more than once. As the graphs shows, searchers spend much less time during their second search. Figure 6 (b) shows that this is not driven by the differences in the bookstores. In the near future we will look in more detail whether this can indeed help to explain some of our findings. 
